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Abstract 
During police interviews, innocent suspects may provide unconvincing alibis due to impaired 
memory processes or guilt-presumptive behaviour on behalf of the interviewer. Consequently, 
innocent suspects may be prosecuted and tried in court, where lay people who serve jury duty 
will assess their alibi’s credibility. To examine lay people’s beliefs and knowledge regarding 
suspect alibis, and specifically about such factors that may hamper innocent suspects’ ability 
to provide convincing alibis, we administrated an eight-question questionnaire across the 
United Kingdom (n = 96), Israel (n = 124), and Sweden (n = 123). Participants did not tend to 
believe that innocent suspects’ alibis might inadvertently include incorrect details, but 
acknowledged that impaired memory processes may cause this. Additionally, most 
participants believed that a presumption of guilt can affect how interviewers interview 
suspect. The findings suggest that lay people who may serve jury duty hold some mistaken 
beliefs regarding alibi provision by suspects.  
Keywords: alibis, innocent suspects, jury, presumption of guilt, survey 
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Beliefs about suspect alibis: A survey of lay people in the United Kingdom, Israel, and 
Sweden 
Innocent suspects who fail to provide a convincing alibi when interviewed by the 
police may subsequently be tried in court, where their alibi may be evaluated again by jurors. 
Are lay members of the public familiar with factors that may lead to an innocent suspect 
providing an inaccurate, incomplete or otherwise unconvincing alibi? Using a survey, the 
current research sought to examine this question. 
Providing a Convincing Alibi 
When providing an alibi to a police interviewer, suspects generally attempt to convince 
the interviewer of their innocence of the crime for which they are being held suspects. This 
process has been identified as the generation domain of alibi provision which comprises two 
phases—the story phase and the validation phase (Burke, Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Olson & 
Charman, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004). During the story phase, suspects provide their alibi by 
reporting from memory about their actions and whereabouts during the time of the crime. In 
the subsequent validation phase, suspects attempt to corroborate their alibi by offering objects 
(physical evidence) or details about people (person evidence) that may account for their 
presence at a certain place at a certain time during the time frame of the crime (Burke et al., 
2007). 
However, during both phases of the generation domain of alibi provision, innocent 
suspects may provide inaccurate information despite being motivated to provide an accurate 
and, ultimately, convincing alibi (see Kassam, Gilbert, Swencionis, & Wilson, 2009). One 
factor that has been found to hamper innocent suspects’ ability to provide accurate 
information is impaired memory processes—a result of the fact that innocent suspects (as all 
truthful rememberers) must rely on their episodic and autobiographical memory to provide 
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their truthful statement (Burke et al., 2007; Culhane, Hosch, & Kehn, 2008; Olson & Wells, 
2012; Strange, Dysart, & Loftus, 2014). Impaired memory processes concern, for example, 
the declining accessibility of event details with the passage of time (Pertzov, Manohar, & 
Husain, 2017; Tourangeau, 2000). Alternatively, innocent suspects may wrongly, though 
unintentionally, integrate details from memories for distinctive events into a report about an 
event that never actually took place (i.e., memory-conjunction errors; Reinitz, Lammers, & 
Cochran, 1992; see also Devitt, Monk-Fromont, Schacter & Addis, 2016).  
In addition to memory problems that may compromise innocent suspects’ ability to 
provide a convincing alibi, factors emerging in the course of the interview may also 
jeopardise their success with respect to convincing the interviewer of their innocence. One 
such factor is the presumption of guilt with which interviewers sometimes approach 
interviews with suspects whom they have never met or with whom they have interacted only 
very briefly. Research on the effects of interviewers’ presumption of guilt on the verbal 
behaviour of suspects during interviews is relatively new. Findings to date have shown no 
correlation between interviewers’ presumption of guilt and suspects’ tendency to confess or 
deny involvement in a crime (Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008), nor have they identified 
evidence that presumption of guilt affects the informativeness and accuracy of innocent 
suspects’ alibis (Portnoy et al., 2019). However, research has shown that this presumption of 
guilt can lead interviewers to conduct more aggressive interviews with suspects and 
ultimately increase the probability that the interviewer will actually judge the suspect as guilty 
at the end of the interview, irrespective of the suspect’s statement (Hill et al., 2008; Kassin, 
Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). These findings thus suggest that when interviewers approach 
the interview already believing the suspect to be guilty, alibis may become less efficient in 
suspects’ attempts to convince interviewers of their innocence. 
Evaluating the Credibility of Alibis 
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The story phase and the validation phase of the generation domain are followed by the 
evaluation phase and the ultimate evaluation phase, which comprise the believability domain 
(Burke et al., 2007; Olson & Charman, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004). In the evaluation phase, 
the credibility of the alibi is evaluated, usually initially by the police. When police 
interviewers investigate an alibi and discover that the suspect provided incorrect information, 
they may fail to attribute such inaccuracies to memory errors (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & 
Strange, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2012). Instead, unintentional inaccuracies in alibis may be 
perceived by the police as an intentional lying and hence guilt (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & 
Strange, 2012; Olson & Charman, 2012). If suspects are judged as guilty during initial phases 
of an investigation (because of, for example, the provision of inaccurate information or 
interviewers’ presumption of guilt), this may ultimately lead to the decision that they should 
be tried in court (Crozier, Strange, & Loftus, 2017; Wells et al., 1998). There, the ultimate 
credibility of the alibi is determined by different evaluators who are exposed to all the facts of 
the case. 
Jury members may be the most influential evaluators of a suspect’s alibi in court. The 
task of the jury is challenging, requiring citizens to reach a verdict by assessing the credibility 
of the suspect and decide whether s/he is innocent or guilty of a crime despite lacking legal 
training (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Greene & Bornstein, 2000; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). 
When suspects confess to a crime and this confession is then presented at trial, an effort is 
often made by defence attorneys and expert witnesses to explain the conditions that may have 
led to the confession in order to ensure that jurors can better decide whether or not the 
confession is reliable (Shaked-Schroer, Costanzo, & Berger, 2015). However, factors that 
may have led to a suspect’s alibi being disbelieved during initial stages of the investigation 
and to the suspect ultimately being tried in court may not be explained to jurors, and they may 
fail to consider such factors when evaluating the suspect’s alibi. During the course of the trial, 
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jurors may assume that there was a justifiable reason to prosecute the suspect, and this 
assumption is likely to make them doubt the suspect’s alibi and guide them in deciding that an 
innocent suspect is guilty (Burke et al., 2007; Sommers & Douglass, 2007). Thus, it is crucial 
that, when necessary, jurors are informed and educated during a trail about the process of alibi 
provision and any factors that may jeopardize the provision of a convincing alibi.  
The Present Research 
 A first step towards improving jurors’ decision making in court during the evaluation 
of suspect alibis is studying what lay people, who may potentially constitute a jury, know 
about pertinent legal matters. Such examination is also required because judges largely base 
their decision of whether or not to allow expert witnesses to testify at trial on their 
assumptions about jurors’ knowledge regarding legal matters (Costanzo, Shaked-Schroer, & 
Vinson, 2010).  
To examine the extent to which lay people, as prospective jurors, are familiar with the 
factors of impaired memory processes and interviewers’ presumption of guilt in the context of 
alibi provision, we recruited lay jury-eligible members of the public in the United Kingdom 
(UK) to complete a two-part questionnaire. To increase our sample size and thus improve the 
precision and power of our statistical analyses, and to improve the diversity of our sample, we 
also distributed the questionnaire to community members in Sweden and Israel. While the 
latter two countries do not employ a jury system1, data from these countries are still 
informative with regard to our research question: lay beliefs and perceptions about alibis.  
In the first part of the questionnaire we examined participants’ knowledge and beliefs 
about alibi provision by truthful versus lying suspects in general, and about the provision of 
                                                          
1 In Israel, verdicts are reached by the judge who then also makes the sentencing decisions (Barak, 1992). In 
Sweden, a panel comprising both professional and lay judges decides on both verdicts and sentencing outcomes 
(Ortwein, 2003). 
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incorrect alibis by truthful suspects in particular. Examining participants’ knowledge about 
the differences in the provision of alibis between truthful and lying suspects was necessary 
because credibility judgments are partly influenced by evaluators’ perceptions and beliefs 
about honest and deceptive verbal (and nonverbal) behaviour of suspects during interviews 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). To this end, participants were first asked to indicate their belief 
about the extent to which six types of details are provided in alibis of truthful versus lying 
suspects. As research has shown that alibis of liars and truth-tellers differ with respect to their 
tendency to provide these details (for a review, see Vrij, 2008; see also DePaulo et al., 2003), 
we wanted to examine how participants’ knowledge would align with such research findings. 
In order not to limit the data we could obtain with respect to participants’ beliefs about the 
differences between truthful and deceptive alibis to one type of verbal behaviour (i.e., the 
tendency of suspects to provide the six types of details presented in the first question), 
participants were then asked to freely describe what strategies they believed truthful and lying 
suspects typically use to make their alibi seem convincing to the interviewer. 
Next, we asked participates what they believed the relation between the amount of 
details provided in an alibi and the truthfulness of the alibi to be, and to explain their answer. 
The purpose of this question was twofold: Firstly, as research has demonstrated that 
statements of truthful suspects are more detailed than those of lying suspects (e.g. DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Vrij, 2008), we were interested in our participants’ belief about the relation between 
alibis’ level of detail and their truthfulness. Secondly, we wanted to see whether or not 
participants would mention the factor of (impaired) memory processes when explaining their 
belief and how they would mention it (e.g., would they explain that a more detailed alibi is 
more likely to be truthful because truth-tellers have a real memory for the critical time?).  
Finally, participants were explicitly asked to indicate their belief regarding the extent 
to which truthful alibis might contain incorrect details. Participants who indicated that truthful 
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alibis may contain incorrect details were asked to explain their answer in order to see if and to 
what extent they would acknowledge the factor of memory constraints as a reason for 
mistakes during the provision of alibis by truthful suspects. To our knowledge, no previous 
research has surveyed lay people’s beliefs about memory in relation to truthful suspects’ 
mistaken alibis.  
The second part of the questionnaire focused on the issue of interviewers’ presumption 
of guilt, which, to our knowledge, has also not been examined in previous survey research. 
We first asked participants to indicate what they believed was the point in the course of the 
investigation in which interviewers begin to form their opinion regarding the suspect’s 
veracity. We are unaware of any data that describe when, during an investigation, 
interviewers usually form their belief regarding the guilt or innocence of suspects. However, 
as research has demonstrated that interviewers may be confident of suspects’ guilt prior to 
interviewing them (Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1992), this question was used to 
examine whether or not participants would consider it likely that interviewers may conduct 
suspect interviews with a presumption of guilt.  
Then, we asked participants to indicate their belief regarding the extent to which a 
presumption of guilt held by interviewers at the beginning of suspect interviews might affect 
the interviewers’ behaviour, and to indicate the likelihood that suspects provide more details 
and confess to committing the crime (regardless of their actual guilt) in response to a guilt-
presumptive interviewer. Despite research on effects of interviewer’s presumption of guilt on 
suspects’ behaviour during interviews being relatively scarce and new (e.g., Hill et al., 2008; 
Portnoy et al., 2019), we wanted to examine what participants believed the effects of 
interviewers’ presumption of guilt on the process of suspect interviews to be and how their 
beliefs would align with existing research findings.  
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Method 
Participants 
Overall, data were collected from 343 members of the general public from three 
countries. Specifically, a convenience sample of 96 participants from the UK, 124 participants 
from Israel, and 123 participants from Sweden completed the questionnaire. Data from 11 
participants were removed from analyses because they did not complete the questionnaire 
thoroughly (e.g., provided a one-word reply to all open-ended questions in a manner unrelated 
to the questions) or failed to meet inclusion criteria (i.e., over the age of 18 years, without 
previous experience of providing a police alibi). This resulted in data from 332 participants 
(M = 29.85 years; SD = 11.33; 210 females, 108 males; 14 participants did not indicate their 
age and gender). Participants were recruited via advertisements on social media. All 
participants who completed the survey were entered into a prize draw for a £20 internet 
shopping voucher.  
Alibi Questionnaire 
An alibi questionnaire comprising eight questions was created in English. The 
questionnaire was translated into both Hebrew and Swedish by native speakers of both 
languages using a back-translation procedure. The three language versions of the 
questionnaire were administrated online using the Qualtrics platform.  
When opening the link to the questionnaire, participants were informed that the 
questionnaire concerned beliefs that members of the general public hold about alibis. 
Participants completed informed consent procedures and were required to confirm that they 
had never provided an alibi as part of a police investigation. At the outset of the questionnaire, 
participants were presented with definitions of the following terms: an alibi, truthful suspects, 
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and lying suspects (see Appendix). Participants were then instructed to work through the eight 
questions, with each question presented on a new screen.  
In the first part of the questionnaire, participants were first asked to indicate, for six 
types of details, the extent to which they thought each type of detail was provided in the alibis 
of lying suspects relative to those of truthful suspects using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
substantially more in liars’ alibis than in truth-tellers’ alibis, 7 = substantially more in truth-
tellers’ alibis than in liars’ alibis). These six types of details were (a) setting (i.e., description 
of the crime scene and/or any other place described in the alibi); (b) temporal (i.e., description 
of the order in which events took place and/or the specific times and dates in which events 
occurred); (c) object (i.e., details about objects used by the suspect and/or by others described 
in the alibi); (d) person description (i.e., details about the appearance of other people 
described in the alibi); (e) self-actions (i.e., details about actions taken by the suspect); and, 
(f) others’ actions (i.e. details about actions taken by people described in the alibi that are not 
the suspect). Next, using two separate questions, participants were asked to freely describe 
what strategies they thought truthful and lying suspects typically use to make their alibi seem 
credible. Participants were then asked what they believed the relation between the amount of 
details provided in an alibi and the truthfulness of the alibi to be. Participants indicated their 
belief by choosing one of three response option indicating that more details in an alibi 
increase or decrease the likelihood that it is truthful, or that there is no relation between an 
alibi’s level of detail and its truthfulness. Participants were also asked to explain their belief. 
Finally, participants were asked to indicate their belief regarding the extent to which truthful 
alibis might contain incorrect details (1 = truthful alibis contain no incorrect details, 7 = 
truthful alibis contain only incorrect details). Participants who indicated that truthful alibis 
might contain incorrect details (i.e., chose 2 or higher on the response scale) were then asked 
to explain their belief.  
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In the second part of the questionnaire, which concerned the factor of interviewers’ 
presumption of guilt, participants were first asked to indicate the point in the course of the 
investigation in which they believed interviewers begin to form their opinion regarding the 
guilt or innocence of suspects. To indicate their belief, participants were asked to choose one 
of five response options (e.g., usually prior to hearing the suspect’s alibi for the first time) or 
to freely report their belief if the options presented were not satisfactory2. Participants were 
then asked to indicate the extent to which they thought an interviewer’s presumption of guilt 
affects what the interviewer says and how s/he behaves during an interview (1 = does not at 
all affect the interviewer’s words and behaviours, 7 = significantly affects the interviewer’s 
words and behaviour). Finally, we asked participants about the likelihood that suspects 
respond to the interviewer’s presumption of guilt by (a) providing more details in their alibi, 
(b) providing details even if uncertain of their accuracy, and, (c) confessing to committing the 
crime (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely).  
On completion of the questionnaire, participants were asked to report their age, 
gender, country of residence, and the main language they use in everyday communications. 
Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Alibi Provision and Effects of Memory Processes 
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations of participants’ responses to the 
question concerning the extent to which setting, temporal, object, person, self-actions, and 
others’ actions details are provided in alibis of truthful suspects relative to those of lying 
                                                          
2 Due to the lack of data (to our knowledge) regarding the point in the course of an investigation in which police 
interviewers usually begin to form their opinion regarding suspects’ veracity, the response options presented to 
participants in this question represented what we believed were plausible options of the timing in which a 
veracity belief is formed by interviewers. In order not to limit participants to these response options and thus not 
to lose access to their actual beliefs, if the response options presented to participants in this question were not 
satisfactory, they could freely report their belief. 
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suspects. One-sample t-tests indicated that, on average, participants believed that most types 
of details are provided significantly more often in truthful than in deceptive alibis. 
  Table 1 about here 
Next, we categorised the freely-reported strategies that participants thought truthful 
and lying suspects typically use to make their alibi seem truthful and convincing to the 
interviewer. The first author coded all responses in a data-driven manner, meaning that the 
categories were derived from participants’ reports. A second coder coded 32 responses (9.8%) 
of participants for each of the two strategies questions (liars and truth-tellers). Tables 2 and 3 
present the categories of the strategies perceived by participants to be used by truthful and 
lying suspects, respectively. The tables also present inter-coder reliability computed using 
intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC). The three most common strategies of truthful 
suspects during alibi provision reported by participants (Table 2) were that truth tellers 
cooperate with the interviewer, express confidence, and provide detailed alibis. With respect 
to liars’ strategies during alibi provision (Table 3), the three most commonly reported 
strategies concerned providing detailed alibis, engaging in general impression management, 
and expressing confidence.  
Table 2 about here 
As two of the three most commonly reported strategies for each of the two strategies 
questions were strategies reported for both truthful and lying suspects (i.e., providing detailed 
alibis and expressing confidence), we examined whether the proportion to which participants 
reported each of these two strategies differed for truthful and lying suspects. Two exact 
McNemar's tests were conducted only among participants whose reports could be coded for 
both truthful and lying suspects’ strategies questions (n = 321). The tests showed that 
participants believed that a detailed alibi occurs more often with respect to lying (39.0%) than 
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truthful suspects (26.6%), p = .001. In contrast, participants believed that expressing 
confidence occurs more often among truthful (30.0%) than lying suspects (16.6%), p < .001.  
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 presents the frequencies with which participants chose each response option to 
the question concerning the relation between the amount of details provided in an alibi and 
the truthfulness of the alibi. A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit revealed that the preference 
for the three response options was not equally distributed, X2(2, N = 332) = 8.32, p = .015. 
Post-hoc analyses of standardized (Pearson) residuals showed that the belief that more details 
indicate a less truthful alibi was reported more often than would be expected by chance, p = 
.021. However, this test just barely failed to reach statistical significance when compared 
against the Bonferroni-corrected alpha (α = .05/3 = .017). None of the other two response 
options approached statistical significance, ps ≥ .112.  
Table 4 about here 
Also presented in Table 4 are participants’ reasons for their belief regarding the 
relation between the amount of details provided in an alibi and its truthfulness. Most 
participants who believed that a detailed alibi is less likely to be truthful explained that liars 
may believe that a detailed alibi is perceived as truthful and convincing. With respect to 
participants who believed that a detailed alibi is more likely to be truthful, most of them 
explained their belief by reporting that the truth is easy to keep track of and thus being 
informative is not difficult. Finally, most participants who believed that the amount of details 
provided in an alibi is not related to its truthfulness reported that the truthfulness of an alibi 
depends on different factors, such as the verifiability of the details provided, the extent to 
which the details provided are central to the main event, and the suspect’s personal strategy to 
appear truthful (which may or may not be to provide a detailed alibi).  
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We then examined participants’ belief regarding the extent to which truthful alibis 
might contain incorrect details. Participants’ beliefs are presented in Table 5. On average, 
participants rated the likelihood that a truthful alibi might contain incorrect details as 
relatively low (M = 3.41, SD = 1.15; 1 = truthful alibis contain no incorrect details). The 
reasons underpinning beliefs that truthful alibis might contain incorrect details to different 
extent, as reported by participants who chose response option 2 or higher on the response 
scale, are presented in Table 5. Most participants who indicated to believe that truthful alibis 
may contain incorrect details explained that this may be due to impaired memory processes. 
Table 5 about here 
  
Interviewers’ Presumption of Guilt 
 The point of the investigation at which participants believed an interviewer likely 
begins to form an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the suspect is presented in Table 6. 
A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit revealed that participants’ preference of the six possible 
response options was not equally distributed, X2(5, N = 332) = 170.37, p < .001. Post-hoc tests 
of standardized (Pearson) residuals, using a Bonferroni-corrected alpha (α = .05/6 = 0.008), 
indicated that participants tended to believe significantly more often than would be expected 
by chance that interviewers usually begin to form their opinion of the guilt or innocence of 
suspects prior to hearing their alibi for the first time (p < .001) or while suspects are providing 
their alibi for the first time (p < .001). The post-hoc tests also indicated that the beliefs that 
interviewers never form a belief regarding suspects’ involvement in a crime and that there 
may be another option for the timing of the formation of this belief (“other” response option) 
were both significantly underrepresented, both ps < .001. The remaining two response options 
were not statistically significant, ps ≥ .074. 
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Table 6 about here  
Then, we found that, on average (M = 5.61, SD = 1.23), participants believed that 
interviewers’ presumption of guilt can affect what interviewers say and how they behave 
during an interview. The explanations underpinning these beliefs are presented in Table 7. 
The most common explanation provided by participants who strongly believed this to be true 
(i.e., chose 5 or higher on the response scale) was that presumptions of guilt make 
interviewers conduct harsher interviews, ask leading questions, and pressure the suspect to 
confess. 
Table 7 about here 
Finally, on average, participants believed that when suspects get the impression that 
the interviewer thinks they are guilty, they will provide more details in their alibi (M = 5.47, 
SD = 1.45) and provide details even if they are uncertain of their accuracy (M = 5.27, SD = 
1.33). However, participants believed that, under such interviewing circumstances, the extent 
to which suspects will confess to committing the crime is low (M = 2.98, SD = 1.45).  
Discussion 
Using a questionnaire administrated in three countries, the present research examined 
lay people’s beliefs about factors that may hinder innocent suspects’ ability to provide 
convincing alibis—impaired memory processes and interviewers’ presumption of guilt. In 
general, participants’ responses indicated that they did not believe that innocent suspects 
might inadvertently provide inaccurate alibis, but that when this happens, impaired memory 
processes are likely to be the reason. With respect to the factor of interviewers’ presumption 
of guilt, participants mostly believed that interviewers usually begin to form their opinion 
regarding the veracity of suspects before or while suspects are providing their alibi for the 
first time. Also, participants tended to believe that a presumption of guilt can affect how 
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interviewers conduct an interview with suspects. Below we discuss all findings in depth and 
review how they fit with existing research.  
Beliefs About Alibi Provision and Impaired Memory Processes 
The most noteworthy finding concerning participants’ beliefs about the qualities of 
suspect alibis was that participants believed that while truth-tellers are more informative with 
respect to specific types of details, liars more often try to appear generally informative. 
Specifically, participants tended to believe that, on average, setting, temporal, object, and 
person-description details are provided only slightly more often in alibis of truthful suspects 
than lying suspects. This belief aligns with existing research findings (Vrij, 2008; see also 
DePaulo et al., 2003). However, when participants freely reported that suspects provide a 
generally detailed alibi to appear convincing, this was reported more often with respect to 
lying suspects than truthful suspects. Most participants also believed that the more details 
provided in an alibi, the less likely the alibi is to be truthful. Previous survey research has 
demonstrated similar beliefs of lay people about the relation between the amount of details 
provided by suspects during police interviews and suspects’ veracity (Granhag, Andersson, 
Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004; Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; but see Akehurst, 
Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996). Liars may succeed in providing a rich, detailed statement by 
describing an actual experience that occurred on a different time than that of the crime, with 
details concerning the crime nevertheless being denied or omitted (i.e., embedded lies; Vrij, 
2008; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). However, this belief of participants that a detailed alibi 
is less likely to be truthful contrasts findings according to which statements of truthful 
suspects are usually more detailed than those of lying suspects (e.g. DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 
2008).  
It may be that participants believed that with the use of two alibi-provision strategies 
they mentioned with respect to liars—making up details and preparing an alibi—liars can 
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maintain a detailed statement throughout the interview and make their lie “work”. Participants 
did mention that a lie is difficult to keep up with; however, they may not fully realise how 
difficult it is. Lying is a cognitively demanding task that requires more mental resources than 
telling the truth does, and even planning a lie may be difficult for liars. They may fail to 
formulate a lie that will convince the interviewer of their innocence, and thus they may decide 
not to provide a detailed statement in an upcoming interview. During the interview, liars must 
remember what information they have already provided to the interviewer earlier in the same 
interview or in previous ones in order to maintain a consistent statement. However, impaired 
memory processes may prevent liars from remembering what information they have already 
provided (and to whom). In order not to struggle with remembering a detailed lie, liars are 
likely to provide a relatively short statement (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008; Vrij, 
Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & Bull, 2008). Indeed, 
innocent, truthful suspects tend more than guilty, lying ones to employ an alibi-provision 
strategy of providing a detailed statement (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Hartwig, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006).  
Turning to the issue of impaired memory processes in the context innocent suspects’ 
alibis, participants’ responses indicated that they were reluctant to acknowledge that truthful 
alibis may unintentionally include incorrect details. This finding embodies another 
demonstration of lay people’s lack of understanding of issues concerning psychology and law 
and is consistent with previous findings that demonstrated this poor knowledge by lay people 
(e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2006; Simons & Chabris, 2011, 2012). 
For example, Benton et al. (2006) found that agreement between 111 jurors from the United 
States and 64 eyewitness experts regarding items concerning eyewitness issues (e.g., memory, 
weapon focus, and elderly witnesses) was obtained only on four (13%) of 30 items.  
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However, when examining the explanations of participants as to why they believed that 
truthful alibis may contain incorrect details, a more encouraging picture emerged. Participants 
acknowledged that impaired memory processes may prevent innocent suspects from reporting 
accurately from memory. For example, participants correctly acknowledged that innocent 
suspects may not encode relevant event details because of not realising the importance of 
remembering the event for a later reporting (see Burke et al., 2007; Tourangeau, 2000). 
Participants also correctly mentioned that event details may be forgotten over time (see 
Pertzov et al., 2017; Tourangeau, 2000). Participants mentioned the factor of forgetting by 
truthful suspects also when explaining why they believed a detailed alibi may indicate that the 
suspect is lying (that is, because impaired memory processes may prevent innocent suspects 
from providing a detailed alibi).  
Altogether, findings from the first part of the questionnaire suggest that participants 
hold some mistaken beliefs about suspect alibis. Nevertheless, participants did demonstrate an 
understanding that innocent suspects may provide incorrect details due to impaired memory 
processes. 
Beliefs about Interviewers’ Presumption of Guilt 
Participants’ beliefs that interviewers’ presumption of guilt may lead them to conduct 
harsher interviews, use leading questions, and pressure suspects to confess align with findings 
of previous research (e.g., Hill et al., 2008; Kassin et al., 2003). This finding regarding 
participants’ beliefs about the effects of presumption of guilt on interviewers, combined with 
the finding that most participants believed that interviewers usually begin to form their 
opinion regarding suspects’ guilt or innocence prior to or while meeting them for the first 
time, suggests that if suspects claim that the interviewer to whom they provided their alibi 
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treated them in accordance with a guilt belief, lay people may find this claim plausible at 
court.  
Participants additionally tended to believe that when suspects feel that they are being 
interviewed by a guilt-presumptive interviewer, they are likely to be more forthcoming and 
not to confess to a crime. However, existing research have found no evidence that when 
suspects are interviewed by a guilt-presumptive interviewer, their verbal behaviour differs 
from that of suspects interviewed by a neutral or innocence-presumptive interviewer (e.g., 
Hill et al., 2008; Portnoy et al., 2019). Nevertheless, research on the effects of interviewers’ 
presumption of guilt on suspects’ verbal behaviour during interviews is relatively new and 
scarce, and has examined narrow interviewing contexts (e.g., interviewing mock suspects 
over the telephone as in Hill et al., 2008). Future research on lay people’s beliefs about 
suspect alibis might compare between the beliefs expressed in the present research and 
findings obtained from new research on the effects of interviewers’ presumption of guilt on 
suspects’ verbal behaviour during interviews. 
In sum, results from the second part of the questionnaire suggest that lay people are 
aware of the fact that interviewers might approach suspect interviews while already 
presuming guilt and that this presumption of guilt might affect how interviewers conduct 
interviews. The findings also suggest that lay people believe that suspects’ verbal behaviour is 
not likely to be negatively affected by a guilt-presumptive interviewer. Future research might 
compare the beliefs of police interviewers with those of members of the general public about 
the topics of memory limitations and presumption of guilt in the context of suspect alibis. 
Contributions of the Present Findings 
Existing findings concerning lay people’s mistaken knowledge about eyewitness 
issues suggest that eyewitness expert testimony may be required in court to educate jurors 
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(e.g., Benton et al., 2006; Simons & Chabris, 2011, 2012). The present findings add to this 
body of research by identifying some of the factors concerning the process of suspect 
interviewing that jurors may need to hear expert testimony about, as their mistaken beliefs 
about these factors may directly affect how they evaluate suspect alibis. Specifically, jurors 
may benefit from being informed that innocent suspects may provide incorrect details due to 
memory constraints despite being motivated to be accurate. In addition, the present findings 
suggest that jurors may also need to be explicitly informed that suspects sometimes provide 
their alibi to a guilt-presumptive interviewer; this should be done especially when suspects 
complain that their interviewer treated them as if they had already decided that they were 
guilty.  
The implications mentioned thus far are relevant only to countries whereby verdicts 
are reached by jurors. Nonetheless, the present findings are also relevant to any country where 
information gathering from suspects is necessary, as these findings can inform the 
development of interviewing techniques. For example, assuming that participants’ beliefs 
about the behaviour of suspects reflect how they would behave as suspects during police 
interviews (as was also suggested by some responses), the finding that they believed that a 
more detailed statement is less likely to be truthful suggests that, as truth-tellers during police 
interviews, they would not try to provide a detailed statement. Accordingly, when 
interviewing suspects and instructing them to provide a detailed statement, it may be crucial 
to also explain to them the importance of being informative, for example, for the course of the 
investigation and the possibility of exonerating them as suspects by having more details to 
verify.   
Finally, the data obtained from the present research may be used in the future to 
examine how lay people’s knowledge and beliefs about suspect alibis and interviewers’ 
presumption of guilt align with new findings obtained following the examination of 
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interviewing contexts that were not applied in previous alibi research, especially in research 
on effects of interviewer’s presumption of guilt on suspects’ behaviour during interviews. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Several limitations are associated with the present research. Firstly, it may be that the 
response options for some questions limited the range of responses, even though participants 
were provided with free space throughout and at the end of the questionnaire to express any 
thoughts they may have had. Secondly, although our findings demonstrate what lay people 
believe and know about the factors of memory failures and presumption of guilt in the context 
of alibis, we did not ask participants whether they would consider these factors when 
evaluating alibis’ credibility. Future research may focus on this specific question. Finally, the 
terms “truth-tellers” and “liars” were used interchangeably as synonyms for “innocent 
suspects” and “guilty suspects”, respectively. Admittedly, guilty suspects may speak the truth 
and innocent suspects may lie in police interviews, and one cannot be certain that 
participants’ reported beliefs about truth-tellers and liars correspond perfectly with their 
beliefs about innocent and guilty suspects, respectively. However, because suspects’ veracity 
and guilt are probably correlated in real life, the conclusions drawn from the present findings 
and the potential contributions of these findings remain valid.  
The present research was the first to examine the extent to which lay members of the 
public are familiar with factors that may hamper innocent suspects’ ability to provide a 
convincing alibi. As lay people in the role of jurors sometimes determine the fate of those 
who may be innocent, the present findings suggest that judges must not prevent memory and 
interview experts from discussing relevant research findings in court (as was the case with the 
United States’ former Vice-Presidential Chief of Staff I. Lewis Libby; see Kassam et al., 
2009) on the grounds that “such research would tell jurors little that they did not already 
know” (ibid, p. 552). In countries where a jury system is not employed (but also in ones 
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where it is), the present findings may assist with informing the development of interview 
protocols. Alongside developing interviewing techniques that work to maximise the quality of 
alibis provided by innocent suspects, further research should examine the extent to which 
(prospective) jury members are informed of the interrogation contexts in which suspects 
provide their initial alibi.  
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Table 1  
Participants’ Belief Regarding the Extent to Which Details Occur in Truth-Tellers’ versus 
Liars’ Alibis 
Note. Beliefs were reported on a scale ranging from 1 (substantially more in liars’ alibis) to 7 (substantially 
more in truth-tellers’ alibis). Reported t-values were computed using one-sample t-tests (df = 331) comparing 
the mean rating against the scale mid-point (4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of detail M (SD) t (p-value) d [95% CI] 
Person description 4.40 (1.52) 4.78 (< .001) 0.26 [0.15, 0.37] 
Temporal 4.38 (1.63) 4.20 (< .001) 0.23 [0.12, 0.34] 
Object 4.37 (1.45) 4.69 (< .001) 0.26 [0.15, 0.37] 
Setting 4.34 (1.72) 3.63 (< .001) 0.20 [0.09, 0.31] 
Others’ actions 4.10 (1.52) 1.23 (= .221) 0.07 [-0.04, 0.18] 
Self-actions 4.00 (1.65)  0.00 (= .990)  0.00 [-0.11, 0.11] 
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Table 2 
Strategies That Participants Believed Are Used by Truthful Suspects to Provide a Convincing 
Alibi  
Strategy 
Frequency 
(% of total N) 
ICC (p-value) 
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 Note. N = 327; Data from five participants were removed from analysis because their reports were too vague. 
Categories are presented in the order of the frequency with which participants reported each category. “Other” = 
strategies that were individually reported by less than 5.5% of participants (e.g., truthful suspects repeat their 
story; report incorrect information; and, do not describe events chronologically). Participants could report a 
strategy more than once and from more than one category. 
Table 3 
Strategies That Participants Believed Are Used by Lying Suspects to Provide a Convincing 
Alibi  
Strategy Frequency (% of total N) ICC (p-value) 
Non-verbal behaviour and impression management   
Suspect is cooperative and does not use strategies 108 (33.0) 0.94 (< .001) 
Suspect expresses calmness/confidence and is 
confident in innocence 
98 (30.0) 0.94 (< .001) 
Suspect engages in general impression management 
to appear and sound innocent 
50 (15.3) 0.79 (< .001) 
Open, calm (sometimes expressive) movements and 
voice 
35 (10.7) 0.84 (< .001) 
Suspect is naturally nervous, fidgety 34 (10.4) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect keeps eye contact with the interviewer 31 (9.5) 1.00 (< .001) 
Informativeness, accuracy, and evidence details   
Suspect provides detailed alibis 87 (26.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect provides person/object evidence details  61 (18.7) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect provides accurate information  54 (16.5) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is informative about self-actions, 
whereabouts, and feelings during the critical time 
37 (11.3) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is not too informative 34 (10.4) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is informative about surroundings and objects 28 (8.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Statement’s characteristics   
Suspect describes events chronologically; provides 
exact times  
36 (11.0) 1.00 (< .001) 
      Suspect’s statement is coherent, logical 34 (10.4) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect’s statement is consistent 24 (7.3) 1.00 (< .001) 
Other  79 (24.2) 0.80 (< .001) 
33 
RUNNING HEAD: BELIEFS ABOUT SUSPECT ALIBIS 
Informativeness, accuracy, and evidence details   
Suspect provides detailed alibis 127 (39.0) .88 (< .001) 
Suspect is not too informative 46 (14.1) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is informative about surroundings and objects 23 (7.1) -* 
Suspect is informative about self-actions, 
whereabouts, and feelings during the critical time 
18 (5.5) .79 (< .001) 
Non-verbal behaviour and impression management   
Suspect engages in general impression management 
to appear and sound innocent; denies guilt  
84 (25.8) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect expresses calmness/confidence  54 (16.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect prepares an alibi; memorises details  53 (16.2) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is naturally nervous, fidgety 41 (12.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Open, calm (sometimes expressive) movements and 
voice (naturally or faked) 
28 (8.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect makes up details 26 (8.0) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect keeps eye contact with the interviewer  25 (7.7) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect appeals to interviewer’s feelings 25 (7.7) 1.00 (< .001) 
Statement’s characteristics   
Statement is coherent, logical (naturally or with 
effort) 
36 (11.0) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect describes events chronologically; provides 
exact times  
33 (10.1) 1.00 (< .001) 
 Statement is vague, not coherent (naturally or on 
purpose)  
22 (6.7) 1.00 (< .001) 
Other  127 (39.0) 1.00 (< .001) 
Note. N = 326; Data from six participants were removed from analysis due to being vague. Categories are 
presented in the order of the frequency with which participants reported each category. “Other” = strategies that 
were individually reported by 4.9% of participants, or less (e.g., liars provide verifiable/unverifiable information; 
feign forgetting/not knowing details; name another person as the culprit; and, do not speak). Participants could 
report a strategy more than once and from more than one category. *Inter-coder reliability cannot be computed 
because of lack of variance in item coding. 
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Table 4 
Participants’ Belief About the Relation Between Amount of Details Provided in an Alibi and 
Its Truthfulness and Their Explanations for Their Beliefs 
  Response option 
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The more details 
provided in the 
alibi, the less 
likely the alibi is 
truthful 
 
 
The more details 
provided in the 
alibi, the more 
likely the alibi is 
truthful 
 
 
The amount of details 
provided in the alibi is 
not related to its 
truthfulness 
  Endorsement of beliefa 
135 (40.7%) 
 
94 (28.3%) 
 
103 (31.0%) 
 
  Explanations for beliefb 
Liars believe that a detailed 
alibi is perceived as truthful 
80 (59.3%) 0 (0.0%) 20 (19.4%) 
The truth is easy to keep 
track of; many details can 
corroborate the suspect’s 
story  
2 (1.5%) 43 (45.7%) 7 (6.8%) 
Depends on different factors 3 (2.2%) 3 (3.2%) 57 (55.4%) 
Truth tellers have memory 
for the critical time  
0 (0.0%) 40 (42.6%) 10 (9.7%) 
Truth tellers do not 
remember everything  
52 (38.5%) 0 (0.0%) 26 (25.2%) 
A detailed alibi seems 
planned  
49 (36.3%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (10.7%) 
Fewer details lower the risk 
of providing incriminating 
information 
2 (1.5%) 33 (35.1%) 4 (3.9%) 
Note. aNumber of participants from total sample (N = 332) who chose this response option (parentheses include 
percentage of total sample). bNumber of participants who provided this explanation out of the participants who 
chose the response option (parentheses include percentage out of the total number of participants who chose the 
response option). Column percentages for explanations do not add to 100%, as participants could provide more 
than one explanation. 
 
 
Table 5 
Participants’ Explanations for Their Belief About the Extent to Which Truthful Alibis Might 
Contain Incorrect Details 
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Explanation 
The extent to which truthful alibis might contain incorrect details  
(1 = truthful alibis contain no incorrect details, 7 = truthful alibis 
contain only incorrect details) 
1 
9* 
(2.7%) 
2 
67  
(20.2%)  
3 
113 
(34.0%) 
4 
75  
(22.6%) 
5 
59 
(17.8%) 
6 
9  
(2.7%) 
Impaired memory processes 
 
0  
(0.0%) 
52** 
(77.6%)  
103 
(91.2%) 
66 
(88.0%) 
51 
(86.4%) 
6 
(66.7%) 
Pressure/excitement from being 
interviewed 
 
0  
(0.0%) 
27 
(40.3%) 
40 
(35.4%) 
23 
(30.7%) 
18 
(30.5%) 
3 
(33.3%) 
On purpose (e.g., to end the 
interview; to cover for another 
truth) 
 
0  
(0.0%) 
15 
(22.4%) 
12 
(10.6%) 
6 
(8.0%) 
5 
(8.5%)  
2 
(22.2%) 
Confusion 0  
(0.0%) 
11 
(16.4%) 
8 
(7.1%) 
4 
(5.3%) 
4 
(6.8%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Other  0  
(0.0%) 
2 
(3.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(1.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Note. Label 7 is not included because no participant chose this response option. *Number of participants from 
total sample (N = 332) who chose this response option (parentheses include percentage of participants who chose 
this response option out of the total sample). **Number of participants who provided this explanation out of total 
number of participants who chose the response option (parentheses include percentage of participants who 
provided this explanation out of the total number of participants who chose the response option). “Other” = 
explanations that truthful alibis may contain incorrect information due to, for example, difficulty to communicate 
thoughts or lack of effort. Participants could provide an explanation of more than one type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Participants’ Belief About the Point in the Investigation at Which the Interviewer Begins to 
Form an Opinion Regarding the Guilt/Innocence of the Suspect 
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Response Option 
 
Frequency (% of 
total N) 
Usually while the suspect is providing the alibi for the first time 118 (35.5%) 
Usually prior to hearing the suspect’s alibi for the first time 93 (28.0%) 
Usually after there is evidence to corroborate/refute the alibi 56 (16.9%) 
Usually after interviewing the suspect several times 42 (12.7%) 
Other   17 (5.1%) 
The interviewer never forms a belief regarding the suspect’s 
involvement in the crime 6 (1.8%) 
Note. N = 332. “Other” category included reports that the point in the investigation at which the interviewer 
begins to form an opinion regarding the guilt/innocence of the suspect varies from one interviewer to another, 
that it depends on factors such as the suspects’ behaviour, and that it may be a combination of several of the 
response options provided.  
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Table 7 
Participants’ Explanation for Their Belief About the Extent to Which Interviewer’s Presumption of Guilt Might Affect What 
This Interviewer Says and How S/He Behaves During This Interview   
Note. Label 1 is not included because no participant chose this response option. *Number of participants from total sample (N = 332) who chose this response option (parentheses include 
percentage of participants who chose this response option out of the total sample). **Number of participants who provided this explanation out of total number of participants who chose 
the response option (parentheses include percentage of participants who provided this explanation out of the total number of participants who chose the response option). Participants 
could provide an explanation of more than one type.  
Explanation of belief 
 
The extent to which interviewer’s presumed guilt might affect what 
this interviewer says and how s/he behaves during this interview 
(1 = does not at all affect the interviewer’s words and behaviours, 7 = significantly 
affects the interviewer’s words and behaviour) 
2 
7* (2.1%)  
3 
13 (3.9%) 
4 
33 (9.9%) 
5 
94 (28.3%) 
6 
88 (26.5%) 
7 
97 (29.2%) 
The interviewer will conduct harsher interviews  
 
1** (14.3%) 4 (30.8%) 6 (18.2%) 50 (53.2%) 55 (62.5%) 44 (45.4%) 
General reports that bias affects the interviewer’s behaviour without 
explaining how  
 
3 (42.9%) 7 (53.8%) 10 (30.3%) 26 (27.7%) 19 (21.6%) 33 (34.0%) 
The interviewer will focus on and/or interpret suspects’ alibi and/or 
behaviour in accordance with the belief and/or ignore contradicting 
information 
 
2 (28.6%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (18.2%) 22 (23.4%) 17 (19.3%) 24 (24.7%) 
Depends on different factors (e.g., the interviewer; existing evidence) 
 
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (33.3%) 3 (3.2%) 1 (1.1%) 2 (2.1%) 
Interviewers are trained to avoid biased interviews and will not communicate 
the suspicion to the suspect  
 
2 (28.6%) 5 (38.5%) 9 (27.3%) 9 (9.6%) 2 (2.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
Report is about effects on suspect, not the interviewer 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.3%) 6 (6.2%) 
